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...in the 20th century, we all know, we had this dot-coms boom-bubble-
and-bust. Most people, at the end, lost money on dot-coms, but it left
us with this incredible internet highway, on which Google and Microsoft
emerged and forged whole new industries.
Thomas L. Friedman (New York Times), interview at MSNBC, October
22nd, 2008
1 Introduction
The nancial crises of the late 1990s and 2000s reignited a lively academic
and policy discussion about the real economic impact of asset price uc-
tuations. Both crises were associated with not only outstanding booms
in equity prices, but also busts involving losses in the equity market.
However, these two crises had a very di¤erent follow-up e¤ects on real out-
comes, like productivity and output. In his review of the history of stock
market crashes between 1800-2000, Bordo (2003) points out that the asset
price busts related to new technologies have had relatively limited negative
implications for the aggregate economy.1 In sharp contrast, he shows that
recessions associated with real estate market busts last longer and lead to
twice as large output losses compared to the ones of any other assets.2
Such experiences have triggered a growing interest in incorporating
frictions in the asset market in general equilibrium models.3 While this
literature invariably accounts for the important role of asset markets for
aggregate outcomes, it often does not shed light on why and how booms-
and-bustsassociated with new technologies, such as the Information and
Communication Technologies (ICT) in the late 1990s, are di¤erent. This
paper contributes to the literature of asset bubbles by o¤ering an under-
standing of the implications of technology-related episodes. We ask: Can
a boom in stocks of technology-intensive rms be welfare increasing in the
1In addition to the late 1990s episode, other well-known episodes regard the introduc-
tion of railways in the United Kingdom and the United States in the mid 19th century,
electricity in the United States in the 1920s (see also Shiller 2000, Kidleberger 2005,
Crafts 2000, Jovanovic and Rousseau 2006).
2A similar argument is found in Catão (2002).
3See, among others, Bernanke and Gertler (1989), S.Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist
(2000), Bernanke and Gertler (2001), Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), Charlstrom and Fuerst
(1997), Holmstrom and Tirole (1997), Cooley, Marimon, and Quadrini (2004), Jermann
and Quadrini (2010), Kyotaki and Gertler (2010).
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short-run and long-run, even if the original boom was ex-post unjustied
by rm-level fundamentals?
To investigate the welfare implications of technology stocks overpric-
ing we develop an analytically tractable general equilibrium model that
captures a number of empirical regularities. Our model accounts for the
trade-o¤ that is emphasized in our opening quote. First, equity overpricing
results in short-term losses for investors who own the equity of these rms
at the time of bust. Second, when equity prices a¤ect R&D producers
incentives to invest in R&D, it also leads to negative net present value
(NPV) investments at the rm level. Taken together, these two direct ef-
fects amount to a negative welfare impact. This impact is present also in
a partial equilibrium analysis. At the same time, there is a positive e¤ect
that is realized indirectly and appears only at the general equilibrium level.
Namely, by increasing aggregate investments in R&D, overpricing induces a
permanent increase in aggregate productivity and workerswages through
the new products that become available via such investments.
The main nding is that such productivity gains can translate in per-
manent gains in the aggregate expected welfare. Importantly, we show also
that there are potential gains in terms of the ex-post realized welfare. We
nd that the su¢ cient conditions for the realized gains, even in the short
run, are that overpricing is not too high and that it lasts long enough. In
this regard, our results are particularly strong as they describe the environ-
ment under which an agent would always be better o¤ in the bubble-like
economy, even at the date when equity prices fall. The predictions of our
model for short-run capital losses and long-run productivity and wage gains
from technology-related equity price uctuations are conrmed empirically
for the case of the 1990sdot-com bubble(see discussion in Section 1.1).
It is important to note that our model delivers innovative insights and
results because it considers two distinct features of the 1990sepisode in
a unied framework. First, we consider an overpricing episode that is
temporary. Second, we show that the presence of welfare gains relies on
the type of assets that are overpriced (i.e., productive assets with positive
knowledge externalities).
The rst feature di¤erentiates our framework and its implications from
the real bubbles literature (e.g., Tirole (1985), Ventura (2006) and Ca-
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ballero, Farhi, and Hammour (2006)), where bubblesare commonly tied
to unproductive assets that are innitely traded in a pyramid scheme, i.e.
that never go bust. For the case of bubble-like episodes related to produc-
tive, technology-related assets like in our setting, Johnson (2007), Pastor
and Veronesi (2005), Pastor and Veronesi (2006), and Pastor and Veronesi
(2009), show how bubblescan arise as a consequence of rational learning
about new technologies. Because these models do not involve overinvest-
ment in equilibrium, there are no real costs when asset prices go bust.
Nevertheless, such costs are empirically relevant. For this reason, they are
incorporated in our welfare analysis.
The same argument extends to Olivier (2000) who examines the welfare
e¤ects of an equity price bubble on productive assets that never go bust
and thereby there are never any capital losses in the equity market. Simi-
larly, to our paper, Olivier (2000) analyzes the case of R&D related assets
and highlights that for the presence of positive welfare e¤ect is crucial to
have positive externatities. However, the only costs of overpricing that he
considers come from an endoegenous increase of the real interest rate that
is of a second-order importance in comparison with the direct costs through
capital losses at the time when equity prices fall.4 Moreover, his framework
predicts predicts long term welfare gains though steady state growth rate
of GDP (productivity and wages). We emphasize in the next section that
the 1990s were rather characterized by long-term gains through only the
level of GDP (productivity and wages), which is what our model predicts.
Kraay and Ventura (2007) relates to the 1990s episode and considers a
bubble driven by investors sentiment that was temporarily diverging from
actual fundamentals. While they consider a bubble that goes "bust", the
main contrast to our paper is that they study the real implications of bub-
bles in unproductive assets as opposed to productive assets. Namely, they
do not model the interaction between stock market dynamics and the dis-
tinct characteristics of R&D sector that drives the aggregate productivity,
which is the main focus of our paper. Also, the main interest in their paper
is on the dynamics of the US government debt and current account in the
early 2000s.
We highlight why there are distinct benets associated with technology-
4We also consider endogenous interest rate in the extension of our basic model.
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related assets booms, as opposed to other assets. In particular, we
emphasize that knowledge spillovers in R&D production induce perma-
nent productivity and wage benets, despite the negative NPV invest-
ments at the R&D rm-level.5 This is because such spillovers cause a
well-understood appropriability problem for private sector R&D that in-
duce underinvestment in R&D. Namely, a claim on the future ow of prof-
its from selling the product, i.e., an equity contract, is not a claim on the
full productivity benets created by developing and manufacturing a new
product. Therefore, in this context, an episode of equity overpricing tem-
porarily creates the missingmarket incentives for R&D investment and
delivers net welfare gains.
The prevalence and importance of knowledge spillovers in R&D produc-
tion is supported by numerous empirical studies (for a review see Griliches
1992, Ishaq 1993, Hall 1995). There is also substantial support that there
is not enough R&D in countries close to the technological frontier. For ex-
ample, Jones and Williams (1998) suggest that optimal R&D in the United
States is at least four times larger than actual R&D (see also Jones and
Williams 2000, Comin and Gertler 2006).6 Underinvestment in R&D has
also been found to be more relevant in sectors with high R&D intensity
and expenditures, like the ICT producing one that was at the centre of the
late 1990s episode.7
The presence of knowledge externalities alone is nevertheless insu¢ -
cient to generate the positive aggregate e¤ects of the equity market boom.
This is because in a frictionless world where the rmsincentives to invest
in technology are not a¤ected by stock prices and there are no credit con-
straints, the R&D investments do not increase during an equity price boom.
In our setting, we allow for a direct feedback from equity price movements
to incentives to innovate.
5Knowledge spillovers have a central role in R&D-based models of endogenous growth
(starting from Romer 1990, Aghion and Howitt 1992, Grossman and Helpman 1991).
6These ndings are despite the United States governments strong involvement in
R&D, which suggests that this friction is not already corrected by R&D subsidies.
7The ICT-producing sector is highly intensive in R&D and patenting activity (Carlin
and Mayer 2003), and receives below-average federal support for its R&D (NSF). A
calculation in the spirit of Jones and Williams (1998) for the ICT-producing sector
would imply a much higher scale of market underinvestment in R&D compared to the
average industry.
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Such a link is motivated in a wide set of economic environments. When
entrepreneurs have no superior information compared to the market par-
ticipants, they would react to prices as they learn information from their
movements. However, incentives to invest can be a¤ected by equity prices
also when entrepreneurs have superior information. For example, Holmes
and Schmitz Jr. (1990) show that equity markets enable e¢ cient specializa-
tion, since innovators can specialize in creating new rms by selling them
to agents who have a comparative advantage in management. Such exit
opportunities are particularly important for R&D intensive sectors, where
innovative talent is scarce and therefore gains from specialization are high.
Moreover, the existence of exit opportunities is a crucial factor for venture
capitalists and growth capital in their investment decisions, both of which
are major sources of funding of innovative projects and are generally seen
as not credit-constrained (see Jovanovic and Szentes 2007, Kortum and
Lerner 2000).
In our baseline model, deviations of equity prices from fundamentals
arise because short-horizoned, risk neutral investors rationally react on
noisy public information.8 ;9 In particular, we examine the case when eco-
nomic agents receive unexpected public news that there is a possibility that
the productivity level will increase permanently at some future date. This
modelling choice of the source and nature of optimism is motivated by the
fact that the late 1990s boomperiod was associated with the widespread
euphoria that the new technologies paved the way for a new economy.
One example of that euphoria, is Alan Greenspans speech at the Federal
Reserve Bank of Chicago, March 6, 199910:
A perceptible quickening in the pace at which technological innovations
are applied argues for the hypothesis that the recent acceleration in labor
productivity is not just a cyclical phenomenon or a statistical aberration,
but reects, at least in part, a more deep-seated, still developing, shift in
our economic landscape. 11
8There is ample empirical evidence that equity prices can deviate from fundamentals
(see extensive surveys by Shleifer 2000, Shiller 2000, Barberis and Thaler 2002).
9The role of news for future productivity in driving economic uctuations has
also been analyzed in the business cycles literature (starting from Pigou 1927); see also
Beaudry and Portier (2006) for evidence.
10See also Gordon (1999), or Goldfarb, Kirsch, and Miller (2007).
11While harder to distinguish in the data, in our model there is a clear separation
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It is however noteworthy that our assumption that optimism is exoge-
nously driven by public information is made both because it allows for a
simple analytical solution and permits exible interpretation of the source
of overpricing.12 One could endogenize it though using both behavioral
or rational mechanisms.13 Concerning the latter, in a related paper, Tinn
(2010) considers an environment where short-horizoned entrepreneurs have
superior information about the value of their rm compared to the average
equity market participant and care about the exit value of their rm. Tinn
(2010) shows that in such a case investment itself becomes a positive pub-
lic signal about the value of their rm. This creates further incentives to
invest in technology and can lead to negative NPV at the rm level, as in
the current paper.14 Therefore, the afore mechanism argues for overpricing,
rather than underpricing, in the context of new technologies.
Our baseline model is an overlapping generations one, which we consider
the preferred approach in the context of episodes similar to the 1990s one.
This is because it captures better the speculative nature of institutional
equity market participants, while it makes our results directly comparable
to the existing rational bubbles literature. Importantly, this framework also
allows us to perform a more elaborate and conservative welfare analysis,
since we trace the evolution of consumption, gains and losses over time.15
We also extend our analysis to consider an innitely lived agent and
endogenous interest rate. We show that our main results are similar to
our baseline results when the representative agent is risk neutral as in the
baseline model. They also remain valid more generally for a wide set of
parameters in the case of a risk averse representative agent.
It is important to acknowledge at this point that equity prices can be
between the labor productivity related to the economys ability to use the new technology
and the one related to the creation of new technological products. The optimism is our
setting is about the former.
12For example, in DeMarzo, Kaniel, and Kremer (2007) overpricing arises because of
a keeping up with Jonesesmotive.
13While the source of this positive public signal is open to interpretation, it should
also be noted that all agents in this model are rational given their information at any
point in time.
14Angeletos, Lorenzoni, and Pavan (2010) analyze a setting where learning is both-
sided, entrepreneurs learn from equity prices and market participants learn from invest-
ments. However their setting does not incorporate knowledge spillovers.
15Conclusions derived from an OLG framework, are also more informative about policy
implications in an environment, where policy makers are likely to be short horizoned.
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positively correlated to R&D investments also in the case that there are
credit constraints. This is because, when there are credit constraints, higher
equity prices reduce the cost of nancing, so that (at least some) rms
can undertake protable investments they could not otherwise (see e.g.,
Stein 1996).16 In the context of the 1990s episode, Jermann and Quadrini
(2007) suggest that the productivity gains can be interpreted as the result
of relaxed credit constraints.17
The positive real e¤ects of equity overpricing due to relaxed credit con-
straints features also in the analysis of Farhi and Panageas (2007). They
emphasize though that equity overpricing encourages just as well nega-
tive NPV investments due to asymmetric information and moral hazard
problems. They nd that the negative e¤ect of such unproductive invest-
ments drove the sector-level outcomes for the period 1980-2005. Polk and
Sapienza (2009) shed further light on the potential negative e¤ects of over-
pricing on rm investment. Specically, they support that equity overpric-
ing leads to overinvestments at the rm level, even after controlling for
the equity issuance channel. Moreover, their nding is stronger for R&D
intensive sectors. Both aforementioned ndings are consistent with our
modelling approach.
As is clear from the above discussion, incorporating credit constraints
in our framework would strengthen our baseline results. This is because in-
creases in equity prices that relax credit constraints would imply unambigu-
ous benets from nancing the positive NPV projects of credit-constrained
rms, as in Jermann and Quadrini (2007). Therefore, we abstract from
credit constraints in this paper purely for the clarity of our argument and
not because this channel is not empirically relevant.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.1 dis-
cusses the empirical facts about 1990s technology related episode. Section
16There is overwhelming support for the positive relation between equity prices and
investment at the aggregate economy, or rm-level (e.g., Barro 1990, Morck, Shleifer,
and Vishny 1990, Blanchard, Rhee, and Summers 1993). There is also evidence that
for credit-constrained rms equity prices a¤ect investment through the equity issuance
channel (see Baker, Stein, and Wurgler 2003).
17Indeed, Hall and Lerner (2010) review theoretical arguments why credit constraints
matter for the case of R&D intensive rms and cite ample evidence in their support.
Also, Allen and Gale 2000 survey theoretical arguments why some activities, like R&D,
may be dependent on equity nance.
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2 sets up the baseline model with overlapping generations of risk-neutral
consumers. Section 3 presents the results of the baseline model focusing
on the impact of temporary equity overpricing on consumption. Section 4
considers the extension with innitely lived consumers with CRRA utility.
Section 5 concludes.
1.1 The 1990s technology-related episode
As already argued, our model o¤ers the background to interpret the late
1990s episode of equity price boom-and-bust as a period of temporary
overpricing of technology stocks driven by optimism. Indeed, during this
period, the equity price movements were positively correlated with the tem-
porary acceleration of R&D investment that was almost entirely concen-
trated in a few high-tech industries, like pharmaceuticals, medical equip-
ment and ICT (see Brown, Fazzari, and Petersen 2009). In particular, from
1994 to 2004 there was a dramatic boom in R&D: the ratio of privately
nanced industrial R&D to GDP rose from 1.40% in 1994 to an all-time
high of 1.89% in 2000.
The 1990s optimism regarding rising protability that lead to the boom,
collapsed with the disappointing announcements of sales at the end of 1999
(see the historical review in Goldfarb, Kirsch, and Miller (2007)). In line
with our model, investors received losses in the aftermath of the equity
market bust. Goldfarb, Kirsch, and Miller (2007) document that as of
September 2002 and following an 18-month long decline, the NASDAQ
index closed with a 4.4 trillion USD market value loss. About a quarter of
this loss concerned the 150 largest Silicon Valley rms.18 Along with the
decline in the equity market, the R&D expenditures followed suit with a
downward correction in the ratio of privately nanced industrial R&D to
GDP.
Nevertheless, the technology rms were overall productive, as their re-
sulting survival rate was on par with or higher than other emerging in-
dustries (Goldfarb, Kirsch, and Miller 2007).19 Further to this, another
18Also, part of these losses came from the dot-comrms that had an IPO during
the boom period, but never proceeded further from the business planning stage (about
19% of all IPOs).
19In line with this, Helbling and Terrones (2003) report that the market-to-book ratios
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well-documented fact during the NASDAQ boom period was the acceler-
ation of new technologies, output and wages (see, e.g. Staiger, Stock, and
Watson 2001): In the mid-1990s, the United States labour productivity
accelerated by 1.05 pp. (see Table 8.3 in Jorgenson, Ho, and Stiroh 2005).
Consistent with our models predictions, the trends in these variables even-
tually regressed to their original levels after 2001,20 but the event of their
short-term acceleration brought important gains in their levels by the end
of the 1990s. In fact, over the entire decade wage gains amounted to 6.9
percent, and employment gains to 15 percent (Ilg and Haugen 2000).21
2 The Model
2.1 Consumers
The economy is small and open, and is populated with overlapping gener-
ations of risk-neutral consumers, who work and invest in assets in the rst
period of their lives, and consume and retire in the second period of their
lives. There is a representative consumer for each generation. In Section 4
we discuss the implications of the set-up of a closed economy with innitely
lived representative agent with more general preferences over risk.
A consumer born in period t is endowed with L units of labor that he
supplies to the nal goods producing sector for a wage wt. There are two
available assets: a risk-free bond and equity. The internationally traded
of dot-com rms remained broadly above their pre-bubble levels in the aftermath of the
2000 bust.
20Robert J. Gordon emphasized the short-lived nature of the gains in trend-
productivity (e.g., see Gordon 2000), while that of wages is reported by Jared Bernstein
and Lee Price in their Economic Policy Institute report of September 2nd, 2005. See
also the retrospective study of Jorgenson, Ho, and Stiroh (2007).
21Jared Bernstein and Lawrence Mishel of the Economic Policy Institute report: In-
come and poverty data for 1998 [..] show that American families are clearly beneting
from the tight labor market and the strong economy. Median family income grew by
$1,475 in 1998, a 3.3% increase over 1997 [..] the largest one-year gain since 1986. Taken
in tandem with last years growth of 3.0%, median workers have not had two such strong
consecutive years in well over two decades.
In 2007 Jared Bernstein reported in the New York Times that according to the United
States Census, the median annual family incomehad increased by 11 percent between
its late 1980speak and its peak in 2000, while by 2007 it fell only by 1 percent with the
latter decline invariably attributed to within-cohort income distribution changes that
are beyond the scope of our study.
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risk-free bond o¤ers a gross return R > 1 and its supply is innitely elastic.
The supply of equity in period t involves shares of monopolistic rms that
engage in R&D and intermediate goods production. All rms pay out their
prots as dividends, t, and their shares are traded in the equity market
at the post-dividend price Pt. The symmetry across assets is a conjecture
to be veried in equilibrium and is due to the lack of rm-specic risks.
The budget constraint of a consumer born in period t is
wtL = Bt + PtHt; (1)
Ct+1 = (Pt+1 + t+1)Ht +RBt;
where Ct+1 is his consumption in period t+ 1, Bt is his demand of risk-free
bond and Ht is his equity demand.
Consumers choose their bond and equity holdings to
max
bt(i);ht(i)
fE [Ct+1] , s.t. (1)g : (2)
2.2 Final good production
Competitive nal good producers use labour, L, and all available inter-
mediate goods to produce output Yt. There is a continuum of distinct
intermediate good varieties available in period t, denoted with xt(j), where
j 2 [0; At] and A1 > 0. The production function is
Yt = (tL)
1 R At
0
xt (j)dj;  2 (0; 1); (3)
where t is the labour augmenting productivity shock that is the only
source of uncertainty in this economy, whose process is presented in detail
in Section 2.4.
The price of the nal good is normalized to one. Final goods producers
take the wage, wt, and the price of intermediate goods, pxt(j), as given and
maximize prots:
max
L;fxt(j)gj
n
Yt  
R At
0
pxt(j)xt(j)dj   wtL s.t. (3)
o
: (4)
The intermediate goods depreciate fully within a period.
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2.3 Intermediate good production and R&D
The nal good producers buy each intermediate good, xt(j), from a mo-
nopolistic intermediate goods producing rm j.
The production of every unit of intermediate good requires the invest-
ment of  units of nal good. In each period t, an intermediate goods
producer j maximizes prots
t(j) = max
pxt (j);xt(j)
n
pxt(j)xt(j)  xt(j); s:t: pxt(j) = @Yt@xt(j)
o
: (5)
In period t, there is a continuum of active intermediate goods producers
indexed with j 2 [0; At].
An intermediates good rm is established by the development of a new
variety. The development of a new variety in period t, e 2 (At; At+1],
requires R&D investment one period before the new variety becomes avail-
able, i.e., period t + 1. This provides the intermediate goods rm, e, with
innitely lasting monopolistic power (e.g., by the means of a patent) and
its prots are t+k(e), where k  1.
The R&D production sector is fully competitive. R&D producers take
the value of their rm, Pt, and aggregate productivity of R&D, t, as given
and maximize their expected net gain from R&D investment, It,
max
It

Pt (At+1   At)  It, s.t. At+1   At = tIt
	
. (6)
To capture the direct e¤ect of equity prices on the incentives to invest in
R&D, it is assumed that the value of a new intermediate good rm for its
owner is equal to rms equity market value. All intermediate good rms
already established in period t, i.e., those established before and already
producing, j 2 [0; At], and those currently conducting R&D, e 2 (At; At+1],
are listed in the equity market. Each of these rms corresponds to one
divisible share that is held by the consumers. The value of all shares listed
in period t is the same, which is a conjecture that is veried from the
equilibrium results of Section 3.1.
While each individual R&D producer takes the R&D productivity t as
given, it is a function of aggregate decisions. In the spirit of Comin and
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Gertler (2006) and Jones (1995), the basic analysis assumes that
t = I
 1
t A
1 
t ;  > 0;  2 [
1
1  ; 1); (7)
which ensures a well-dened steady-state, bears an exogenous component,
, and captures two spillover e¤ects of the individual R&D entrepreneurs
decisions. First, an increase in the number of known varieties, At, increases
permanently the R&D productivity (positive knowledge externality). Sec-
ond, as the aggregate R&D investment increases, the marginal productivity
of individual R&D investment decreases (negative congestion externality).
The parameter  captures the overall productivity of R&D production, as it
governs the relative strength of knowledge externalities in R&D production
over the congestion ones.
It is worth noting that parameter  in (7) is crucial in building up
a hypothesis for technology related assets. As already emphasized in our
Introduction, a dening feature of R&D production is that it bears positive
spillovers that are su¢ ciently strong to imply aggregate underinvestment
in a competitive equilibrium without mispricing compared to the optimal
allocations, aka the Social Planners equilibrium. The condition that  2
[
1
1  ; 1) ensures that our model bares this R&D feature, which is why it
is maintained throughout our basic analysis.
Yet, the specication in (7) is exible enough to allow the discussion of
the models implication for values of parameter  out of this interval. In
Section 3.2.3 we contrast our results to the ones of the limit case where  =
0. When  = 0, then the intermediate goods sector is a non-R&D sector
because we e¤ectively shut down the e¤ect of positive knowledge spillovers
on R&D production. It is also clear from (7) that the congestion externality
is the strongest when  is close to zero. This allows us to highlight why the
aggregate impact of technology related booms-and-bustsis di¤erent from
those related to other sectors featuring strong congestion externalities, like
real estate.22
Figure 1 summarizes the interaction among all agents in this economy
22We acknowledge that we abstract from some other features of real estate, but our
aim is to analyze the case of technology related assets. Therefore, we refer to real
estate only for illustrative reasons as it is a common example of a sector with a strong
congestion externality.
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Figure 1: Timing of production and consumption decisions.
and the timing of their actions.
2.4 Information structure
All agents have identical information and there is only a short episode of
uncertainty. Initially the labour productivity is constant at the level 
and expected to stay constant for all periods t <  . To capture the idea
of the emergence of a new economy, like the 1990s, we assume that in
some arbitrary period t =  there is an unexpected public signal of strictly
positive likelihood of that there is may be a permanent shift in long-run
productivity from t = +T onwards. Namely, there are two possible states,
u 2 fH;Lg, that can be realized in period t =  :
t =
(
H w.p. Q
L w.p. 1 Q for any t   + T ,
where H > L  . Perfect information concerns the case when Q =
0, so as to capture the presence of erroneous optimism of a permanent
improvement in productivity thereby prots (dividends) of intermediate
goods producers (see Section 3.1.1 below).
For the sake of clarity, we present the results for the case where L = .
Note that in periods   t   + T   1, it holds that period t expectations
are
Et [+T+k] = Q
H + (1 Q) =  (1 + ) ,
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where k = 0; 1;... and
 = Q
H   

(8)
measures the degree of optimism. All the main results are valid for some
permanent improvement, i.e., L > .23
It is worth keeping in mind, and as is shown below, that uncertainty
about labour productivity implies uncertainty about the demand and thereby
prots (dividends) of intermediate goods producers (see Section 3.1.1).
2.5 Markets
In every period t, the nal good production, Yt, and the returns from the
previous periods risk-free asset investment, RBt 1, are used to nance
aggregate expenditures on consumption, Ct 
R 1
0
ct(i)di, investment in
intermediate goods production, Xt 
R At
0
xt(j)dj, R&D investment, It,
and purchases of the risk-free asset Bt 
R 1
0
bt(i)di. The goods market
clearing condition is
RBt 1 + Yt = Ct +Xt + It +Bt: (9)
All consumers are employed by the nal goods sector, and the labour mar-
ket clears for the equilibrium wage wt.
The supply of equity in period t consists of At shares of current inter-
mediate goods producers and At+1   At new shares issued by R&D pro-
ducers, so that supply is At+1. The equity price ensures market clearing,
Ht = At+1.
23An earlier draft examines the case of adding private infomartion in a setting which is
very close to the one of the present paper. The main results are robust to this extension,
and are available from the authors upon request.
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3 Results
3.1 Equilibrium outcomes
3.1.1 Final and intermediate good production
From (3) and (4), the nal good producersoptimal demand for variety j
is independent of the demand for any other variety j0 6= j, i.e., pxt(j) =
L1 x 1t (j) for any j. Using this in (5), the demand for intermediate
goods is linear in labor productivity and is the same across intermediate
goods producers,
xt (j) = xt 

2

 1
1 
Lt. (10)
The price of each variety is pxt(j) =


. From (5), this implies that all
intermediate goods producers have the same prots,
t =  t ;     (1  )

2

 
1 
L: (11)
This shows that uncertainty about future labor productivity implies uncer-
tainty about the future prots of intermediate goods producers. Because
prots are perfectly correlated across intermediate goods producers, then
the equity price, Pt, needs to be the same across rms in any period t. The
latter conrms the original conjecture for symmetry of equity prices across
rms in Sections 2.1 and 2.3.
3.1.2 R&D production
An individual R&D producers decision for R&D investment (see equation
(6)) determines the relationship between the equity price (the value of a
new variety) and individual R&D productivity, Pt = 1t . Using (7), the
endogenous t implies
It = At
1
1 P
1
1 
t : (12)
Perfect competition and free entry to R&D production implies zero
prots for R&D producers and from (6),
Pt (At+1   At) = It: (13)
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This condition shows that aggregate R&D investment in period t equals the
total stock market value of the new rms producing intermediate goods that
are established in the same period.
Using (12) and (13), the R&D growth rate is an increasing function of
equity price,24 i.e.,
gA;t  At+1 AtAt = 
1
1 P

1 
t : (14)
This highlights that the equilibrium equity price determines the develop-
ment of R&D over time and therefore real economic activity. Given the
elasticity of R&D growth with respect to equity price, 
1  > 0, the real
impact of equity price is higher the higher the R&D productivity  is.
In sharp contrast, in a non-R&D sector, where  = 0, it is clear from
(14) that the growth rate becomes exogenous as lim
!0
gA;t = .
3.1.3 Asset prices
From consumer problem (2), it follows that in any period t, the following
no arbitrage condition holds, i.e. the equilibrium equity price is
Pt =
E[Pt+1 + t+1]
R
: (15)
By (15) and the law of iterated expectations and the equilibrium equity
price equals the present discounted value of the expectations of future prof-
its, i.e.,
Pt =
P1
k=1
E[t+k]
Rk
: (16)
There is certainty in periods t <  and t   + T and using (11) and
(16) it holds that Pt =
 
R 1 for t <  . Similarly Pt =
 u
R 1 for t   + T
and u 2 fH;Lg. To relate to the 1990s episode, we consider the case where
u = L realizes.25 During the period of uncertainty, the future prots are
uncertain and prices can be found from (8), (11) and (16). Overall, in the
24 @gA;t
@Pt
= 
1
1  
1 P

1  1
t > 0.
25Our results would be straightforwardly reversed if state u = H realizes instead.
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model economy the prices are
P+k =
 
R  1 + 
 
(R  1)RT k 1 ; for k 2 f0; :::; T   1g ; (17)
Pt =
 
R  1 , for t <  and t   + T:
In order to account for the e¤ect of equity market overpricing, a useful
benchmark is an economy where consumers have perfect public information;
referred as the PI economyfrom now onwards. The PI equilibrium equity
price, P PIt , Q = 0, and by (8) it also implies that  = 0, i.e.,
P PIt  lim
!0
Pt =
 
R  1 for any t. (18)
The wedge between the models and the PI economys equity price is due
to the perceived positive probability of the high state.
Finally, from consumers rst period budget constraints (1), and using
that equity supply is At+1, then the aggregate risk free asset holding is
Bt = wtL  PtAt+1: (19)
3.1.4 Consumption, output and goods market clearing
Using (10) in nal goods production function (3), the equilibrium nal good
production is linear in t, given the endogenous productivity level At, i.e.,
Yt =
 
(1  )tAt; (20)
where   is dened in (11).
The equilibrium wage is determined by solving the nal goodsproduc-
ers prot maximization problem and is also linear in t given At, i.e., from
(4) and (20) wt = (1  )YtL =  LtAt.
From the consumersbudget constraint (1), the equity market clearing,
(19) and (20), the aggregate consumption is
Ct = (Pt+t RPt 1)At+Rwt 1L = (Pt+t RPt 1)At+R tAt 1. (21)
This highlights the channels through which imperfect equity market
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a¤ects welfare. There is a direct channel from the excess capital gains,
Pt + t   RPt 1 > 0, or losses, Pt + t   RPt 1 < 0, from investing in one
unit of equity. There is also an indirect channel from the impact that equity
price has on the R&D production through (14) and thereby the number
of varieties in every period. This indirect channel works by determining
both the level of wages,  

tAt 1, and level of excess capital gains or losses,
(Pt + t  RPt 1)At.
Finally, using (10) for Xt, and (11), (19), (20), (21) in the goods market
clearing condition (9), gives the free-entry condition for R&D production
(see (13)). This conrms that the goods market clears in every period,
which completes the equilibrium outcomes of the model.
3.2 Impact of temporary equity overpricing
This section addresses the main question of the paper by examining the im-
pact that short-term equity overpricing has on economic allocations. Sec-
tions 3.2.1 and 3.2.2 consider the e¤ect of overpricing on the R&D sector,
where aggregate productivity is given by (7). Section 3.2.3 contrasts these
ndings to e¤ects of overpricing on non-R&D assets, where  = 0.
3.2.1 Consumption gains
Given the equilibrium path of prices, (17) and (18), equation (21) fully
species the path for aggregate consumption. In particular, from the equity
price in PI economy (18) and prots (11), it is straightforward that there are
no excess capital gains or losses in the PI economy, i.e., Pt+t RPt 1 = 0.
Consumption in PI economy is determined by wages which grows at the
constant R&D growth rate gPIA = 
1
1 
 
P PI
 
1  .
Further, from (14) and (17), R&D growth in the model economy is
greater than in the PI economy for the same T periods that its equity prices
exceed these in the PI economy, i.e., gA;t+k > gPIA for k 2 f0; :::; T   1g.
In turn, inspection of the path of consumption (21) suggests a potential
trade-o¤ between higher wages and excess capital losses. The following
proposition summarizes the outcome of the interplay of the direct and
indirect e¤ects that temporary equity overpricing has on the consumption
(21) of each generation.
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Proposition 1 When T > 1, and there is overpricing,  > 0, then ag-
gregate consumption in the model economy is at least as high as in the PI
economy
Ct  CPIt ;
for all periods, except t =  + T . In period t =  + T , the comparison of
consumption between the model and PI economy is ambiguous and depends
on the parameters of the model.
Proof. See Appendix A.
This result is driven by the positive indirect e¤ect that higher equity
prices have on consumption through higher R&D growth. The level of R&D
in the model economy is higher than in the PI economy from t =  + 1
onwards, and all generations of consumers consuming from period t = +2
onwards receive higher wages compared to consumers in the PI economy.
At the same time, equity prices have a direct e¤ect on the path of
excess capital returns. This e¤ect is present only for two generations. It
is positive for the generation consuming in period t =  , which sells its
equity holdings in the rst period that equity price increases because of
the optimistic public signal. This generation has higher consumption than
the PI one, solely due to receiving excess capital gains. It is negative
for the generation consuming in period t =  + T , which is the only one
receiving excess capital losses. This generation faces high equity prices
when investing, but it consumes when the impact of the single optimistic
public signal on expectations is over and prices return to their original
level. How much consumption decreases depends on the indirect impact of
the signal through the expansion of R&D products, as well as the size of
equity market, i.e., A+T . Figure 2 considers the case of a single-release
of an optimistic signal in period t for T = 6 and illustrates its impact
on economic variables of interest. Note that equity prices, R&D growth,
consumption and wages are ratios of the model economy variables to the
corresponding variables in PI economy.26
26The variables are "Equity price" - Pt=PPIt ; "R&D growth" - gA;t=g
PI
A;t; "Consump-
tion" - Ct=CPIt , "Excess capital gains" - (Pt + t  RPt 1)At; "Riskfree-asset holdings"
- Bt= (Bt + PtAt+1) and "Wages compared" - wt 1=wPIt 1. Parameters are were chosen
for purely illustrative purposes with  = 0:8 and  = 0:3.
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Figure 2: The impact of an optimistic signal on main economic variables.
3.2.2 Welfare gains
Proposition 1 above reveals that temporary overpricing in the equity mar-
ket involves important trade-o¤s. First, there is an intergenerational con-
sumption trade-o¤. Second, there is an intratemporal trade-o¤ concerning
the generation consuming in period  + T . This generation assumes the
entire cost of raising R&D investment for T periods through excess capital
losses, but gains though higher wages. To answer the question whether
there is scope for welfare improvement in the presence of temporary equity
overpricing, the criterion is Pareto improvement over the PI economy in
the welfare of each generation.
Concerning ex-ante welfare, we look into the expected consumption
level in period t + 1 for the generation born in period t and ask whether
the consumer cohort is ex-ante better o¤ being in the Model economy, as
opposed to the PI one.
Corollary 1.1 Assume  > 0 and any degree of equity overpricing  > 0.
Then, no generation of consumers is ex-ante worse o¤ compared to the PI
economy, Ut = EtCt+1  UPIt = EtCPIt+1; for any t.
Proof. Because of the no arbitrage condition (15), there are no expected
capital gains or losses for the risk-neutral individuals. Therefore, using (21)
to calculate expected utility in equilibrium, it follows that Ut = EtCt+1 =
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R 

At, and UPIt = EtC
PI
t+1 = R
 

APIt , so that unless  = 0, then Ut > U
PI
t
8t   + 1, while Ut = UPIt 8t  :
We strengthen our conclusions by investigating further whether there is
scope for Pareto improvement even in terms of ex-post realized welfare, i.e.,
realized consumption level. In other words, if consumers in period t were
o¤ered the choice between retaining the overpriced equity of the Model
economy until t + 1 and assuming any related capital gains, or shifting to
the state of no history of equity overpricing, they would prefer to be in the
Model economy.27 A su¢ cient condition for this is the one ensuring no net
losses for the realized consumption of generation  + T .
Corollary 1.2 Assume that T > 1 and  >  > 0.28 Then, there ex-
ists some degree of equity overpricing,  > 0, such that no generation of
consumers is worse o¤ compared to the PI economy, Ct  CPIt ; for any t.
Furthermore, the higher is T , the higher is .
Proof. See Appendix B.
Corollary 1.2 suggests that the net e¤ect of temporary equity overpric-
ing on C+T depends on the degree of equity overpricing , and duration,
i.e., the length of horizon that the optimistic public signal a¤ects expec-
tations T . The net e¤ect of temporary equity overpricing also depends
on all models parameters relating to the productivity of R&D that are
summarized in terms of . In the welfare analysis that follows we continue
to restrict attention to welfare calculations based on ex-post consumption
outcomes.
The necessary condition for Pareto improvement of the model economy
is that a small degree of equity overpricing has a big R&D productivity out-
come. In such environment, the increase of R&D investment bears a very
low cost in terms of (unit) excess capital losses, while it generates high wage
returns. The length of the period during which the single optimistic signal
a¤ects equity market participantsexpectations is also highly important.
27Of course, this is not to say that a consumer born in t in the Model economy would
prefer to keep the ex-ante known overpriced equity, over the the alternative of being in
the Model economy with no overpriced equity holdings.
28Namely  solves R 1R

1  = 

1+
1
1  (  R 1 )

1 
2

1
1  (  R 1 )

1 
. See Appendix B for details.
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The larger is T , the higher is the likelihood of Pareto improvement due to a
single optimistic public signal. This is because the productivity gains from
equity overpricing are accumulated over a longer time period and therefore
su¢ ce to cover higher excess capital losses.29
In order to understand what allows equity overpricing to be potentially
Pareto improving, it is useful to compare the PI economy with the so-
cial planners solution. The social planner maximizes consumption of all
generations at the beginning of time,
W1 =
P1
t=1
1
Rt 1Ct,
on a steady-state path, where the initial period t  1,M0; A1 > 0 are given
and technology evolves according to At+1   At = It A1 t (see equations
(6) and (7)).30
Comparing the valuation of rms listed in the PI economys equity
market to their social value leads to the following Corollary.
Corollary 1.3 The social value of an additional unit of R&D, P SP , is
always higher than the private one, P PI , i.e.,
PSP
PPI
= 1

1
1 
R 1
R 1 (1 )gSPA
> 1 (22)
and the socially optimal growth rate solves
R  1 = 1=  gSPA   1   

1
1 
+ (1  )gSPA . (23)
Proof. See Appendix C.
Corollary 1.3 shows that equity is underpricedin the PI economy. In
particular, the return from equity of any individual intermediate-good rm
is the future prot ow of that rm. However this does not compensate for
increasing productivity for all future R&D producers. Furthermore, this
29As an illustration, when T = 1, then the generation consuming in  + 1 nances
the higher R&D, but cannot yet benet in terms of higher wages. As a result, its
consumption is strictly lower than in the PI economy.
30The social planner is assumed to discount the consumption of future generations
with the risk-free interest rate. This is because assuming a social discount factor of ,
then the case when R = 1; is the only one that admits a well-dened interior solution
for endogenous growth, where the transversality conditions are not violated.
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does not compensate for the positive e¤ect of a new variety on the nal
good productivity. Therefore, both the monopolistic distortion and the
positive spillover e¤ects imply that the private return to R&D investment
is lower than its social return.
More specically, the rst term,  
1
1  , in (22) captures the e¤ect of
monopolistic distortion, which implies that the production of intermedi-
ate goods in the PI economy is too low.31 The second term, R 1
R 1 (1 )gSPA
,
highlights that the social discount rate is lower than the private one. The
e¤ective discount rate accounts for the knowledge externalitys growth ef-
fect, given by the product of optimal growth rate, gSPA , with the elasticity
of new varieties production to the existent knowledge stock, 1  .
However, the low private return to R&D in the PI economy does not nec-
essarily imply that there is also underinvestment in R&D. This is because
of the negative congestion externality of any individual R&D producer on
othersproductivity. Therefore, increasing R&D investment and thereby
R&D growth (see (14)) is not socially optimal.
Corollary 1.4 A su¢ cient condition that there is underinvestment in R&D
in PI economy compared to the socially optimal one is    11  . Under
this condition
SP > PI , gSPA > gPIA ;
where SP  ISPt
ASPt
and PI  IPIt
APIt
.
Proof. See Appendix D.
Given (7), Corollary 1.4 shows that it is always benecial to increase
R&D investment. While incentives to perform more R&D are absent in
the market, the analysis of Section 3.2.1 showed that these incentives are
created by the temporary equity overpricing. This brings R&D investment
in the model economy temporarily closer to the socially desirable level,
which provides scope for a Pareto improvement.32
31Appendix C shows that xSP =



 1
1 
L. From (10) it holds that x
SP
xPI
= 1

1
1 
.
32It is worth highlighting though, that had we asked the social planner to make a
choice from the viewpoint of a short-lived consumer born in t, and retiring in t + 1;
then to the extent that he is not altruistic, he would pick to spend no resources on It.
In other words, for Pareto e¢ ciency it is essential to have both the long-horizons and
internalization of any spillovers.
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3.2.3 Non-R&D sector
This Section concerns the case where  = 0, while maintaining all other
assumptions of Section 2. As discussed in Section 2.3, this concerns a non-
R&D sector that features strong congestion externalities but no knowledge
spillovers. It is clear that  does not a¤ect the equilibrium in the equity
market and therefore the equity price in the Model economy and PI econ-
omy are still given by (17) and (18) of Section 3.1.3. However, the e¤ect
of temporary overpricing on consumption is dramatically di¤erent from
Proposition 1 and Corollary 1.2.
Corollary 1.5 If  = 0, then consumption in the Model economy and PI
economy are equal (i.e., Ct = CPIt ) for any t 6= f;  + Tg and it always
holds that
C > C
PI
 and C+T < C
PI
+T , where
C   CPI  < jC CPI jRT .
Proof. See Appendix E.
Corollary 1.5 highlights that in a setting with no positive knowledge
spillovers there cannot be ex-post Pareto improvement due to temporary
equity overpricing. The reason is the following. As shown at the end of
Section 3.1.2, there is no endogenous growth when  = 0. Therefore, devel-
opments in equity market have no impact on aggregate output and wages,
and the positive indirect e¤ect of temporary overpricing on consumption is
absent. This implies that the only e¤ect of temporary overpricing on ag-
gregate consumption arises through excess capital gains and losses. When
overpricing starts there are always realized capital gains, and when it n-
ishes there are always realized losses for investors. Corollary 1.5 also shows
that the eventual capital losses are bigger in discounted absolute value than
the initial gains. The reason for this is that the economy is growing and
there are new (non-R&D) rms entering the equity market. Therefore the
busthas a relatively larger negative e¤ect on aggregate consumption.
The negative e¤ect of overpricing of non-R&D assets can be further
seen by comparing investments in this setting with the socially optimal
investments.
Corollary 1.6 If  = 0, then there is always positive investment the Model
25
and PI economy as t = ItAt = Pt > 0 and t = P
PI
t , while the Social
Planner would set SP = 0.
Proof. See Appendix E.
Corollary 1.6 shows that in contrast to the case of R&D investment,
there is always overinvestment in an economy where the congestion ex-
ternality is strong. Therefore, higher equity prices that encourage higher
investments in this setting always have a harmful e¤ect on aggregate con-
sumption. The positive investment in the market equilibrium is driven by
the fact that these investments are essentially entry costs that give future
prots and market power to rms. This creates distortions at the aggregate
level that are not o¤set by any positive externalities and unlike the tech-
nology sector market power and investments are unnecessary for growth.33
The results above highlight that considering knowledge spillovers is cru-
cial for understanding the aggregate e¤ect of events such as technology
stocks boom and why the benets of similar booms related to rms in
other sectors do not incorporate similar indirect benets at the aggregate
level.
4 Extension: innitely lived consumer in
closed economy.
In Appendix F we solve the general case of the model with innitely lived
consumer with CRRA utility in a closed economy, where the interest rate is
endogenous. As our preferred setting is the overlapping generation model
above, we only discuss some of the main ndings to see the degree to which
our main conclusions extend to this setting. This setting maintains all the
assumptions of the main model regarding production side and uncertainty
(i.e., the news about potential productivity improvement is unexpected).
The representative consumer problem is
maxE [Ut] = E
hP1
s=t
s t C1 s  1
1 
i
: (24)
33It is clear that if we were to consider a small  instead of the extreme case of  = 0,
some positive investments would be optimal, however from Corollary 1.4 and 1.6 we
would expect the same qualitative e¤ects as there would always be a tendency towards
overinvestment at the aggregate level.
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subject to the budget constraint for every period s and state u 2 fH;Lg34
Bus +H
u
s P
u
s + C
u
s = w
u
sL+R
u
s 1B
u
s 1 +H
u
s 1 (P
u
s +  
u) . (25)
Namely there is a budget constraint for either states u 2 fH;Lg for all
variables in s >  + T and subscript u is irrelevant (or equivalently u = L)
for all variables in s <  + T as the state has not realized yet.
The goods market clearing condition in this setting becomes
Yt = Ct +Xt + It. (26)
Lemma 2 During the period of uncertainty   t   + T   1, the growth
rate of R&D gA;t > gPIA;t, if and only if there is equity overpricing during the
period of uncertainty. If consumers are risk neutral, then there is always
overpricing and higher growth in the model economy. When consumers are
risk averse then the necessary and su¢ cient condition for equity overpricing
is satised more easily if the elasticity of the long term growth rate with
respect to labour productivity is high. Consumption in any period is given
by Ct = At

1+

    gA;t

 1


where gA;t = gPIA;t = g
PI
A for t <  and
t >  + T   1.35
Proof. The rst statement is an immediate consequence of (14). The rest
is in Appendix F.
Lemma 2 shows that for various parameter values the main features of
the model remain valid, i.e., there is overpricing and temporary acceleration
of R&D growth. If this is the case, then it is straightforward that after the
resolution of uncertainty consumption is permanently higher and utility
from t >  + T   1 onwards is also always higher than in the PI economy.
However, there must be an initial fall in consumption at least in period
t =  . The main reason for this is that unlike the main model where agents
had an opportunity to borrow from abroad, there is no such opportunity in
a closed economy setting. This always holds at the limit case of  ! 0 (high
34Similarly to the main model, in every period, the available assets is equity of R&D
and intermediate goods producers and a one period bond. Di¤erently from the main
model the bond supply is xed at B0 due to closed economy assumption. We would
obtain the same solution for all real variables with other types of assets.
35We maintain the implicit assumuption that the parameters are such that consump-
tion is always non-negative.
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intertemporal elasticity) that is most directly comparable to our baseline
setting with risk-neutral agents.36
We can further characterize the equilibrium growth rate in the risk-
neutral case as follows.
Corollary 2.1When  ! 0 then the interest rate is always constant R = 1

and the R&D growth rate in PI economy is
gPIA =


1 
1
 
 
1 
(27)
and during the period of uncertainty the growth rate in the model economy
is
gA;+k =


1 
1
 + 
T k
1  
1
 
 
1 
for k = 0; :::; T   1. (28)
Proof. Taking the limit of  ! 0 of R&D growth rate in the more general
solution in Appendix F and using (8) proves the corollary.
Corollary 2.1 highlights again the result stated in Lemma 2 that during
the period of uncertainty the growth rate of R&D is (and equivalently
equity prices are) higher in the model economy than in the PI economy.
In fact, the prices are the same as in the baseline model in Section 3.1.3.37
Also notice that during the transition period, the growth rate is at its lowest
level in period  when the news about potentially higher long-term labour
productivity arrives and at its highest level just in period  + T   1, just
before the uncertainty resolves (@gA;+k
@k
> 0). This observation is useful for
the following result.
Lemma 3 When  ! 0 the growth rate in PI economy is always lower
than the socially optimal one. Furthermore, there always exists a degree of
36The reason why results are likely to change for high values of  is the following.
High  makes consumers less willing to substitute lower consumption today for higher
consumption in the future. Therefore, a positive news about future productivity makes
them to prefer to increase their consumption immediately and unwilling to invest in
technology during the period of uncertainty. The latter leads to slower growth and
lower equity prices than in the PI economy. It is worth emphasising that this result is
again largely driven by closed economy assumption. It is worth noting that in order in
the case of 1990s and other similar episodes both inability to borrow from abroad and
high risk aversion are arguable unrealistic.
37Recall that from (14) Pt+k = (gA;t+k)
1 
  
1
 and therefore Pt+k =

1   +
T k
1   , which is the same as (17) given that R =
1
 .
28
optimism,  > 0, such that consumers utility is higher in any period t  
in the model economy than in the PI economy.
Proof. Because  ! 0 implies that utility is linear in consumption and
R = 1=, the Social Planners problem in this case is exactly as the one
already discussed in Section 3.2.2. Therefore, welfare maximizing growth
rate is given by (23). Given this and (27) we nd that
 
gPIA =g
SP
A
 1 
 =
1  
1  (1  )gSPA
.
 
1
1  . Because 1  
1  (1 )gSPA < 1 and  
1
1  >
1, it is clear that gPIA < g
SP
A . For the second part of the lemma notice that
by Lemma 2 consumers utility in any period t >  + T   1 and the same
holds for expected welfare for any t >  + T   1 as utility in the high
state productivity state is necessarily higher. For the period of uncertainty
it is su¢ cient for strictly higher welfare that that the R&D growth is al-
ways gPIA < gA;+k  gSPA . As gPIA < gA;+k holds for any  > 0 and
gA;+T 1 > gA;+k for any k = 0; :::; T   2, we can show that there is exists
 = ^ > 0 such that gA;+T 1 = gSPA . From (23) and (28) we nd that
1 =
(gA;+T 1)
1 
   
1  
1
  
(gSPA )
1 

 
1
1  + 
1  (1  )gSPA .
Setting gA;+T 1 = gSPA and  = ^, we nd that
^ =


  11  1

(gSPA )
1 
 1 

+(1 )(gSPA )
1


1
  
,
which is indeed always positive as  
1
1  > 1.
Lemma 3 conrms the main result of the paper for the case of innitely
lived risk-neutral consumers in a closed economy. Provided that there are
positive knowledge externalities, some degree of equity overpricing (even if
it is temporary) leads to welfare improvement. While this result is most
stark in the case of risk neutrality, it holds more generally, at least for the
case where risk aversion is not too high.
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5 Conclusion
This paper builds a model to analyze the e¤ect of equity overpricing on
aggregate welfare, given the trade-o¤ between excess capital losses from
the equity holdings of R&D intensive rms and productivity gains from
the new R&D products. We emphasize that for a full account of the costs
and benets of equity overpricing of technology-related assets, it is nec-
essary to use a general equilibrium framework that captures a number of
empirical regularities associated with technology-related assets. Our main
result is that equity overpricing can increase (ex-post) welfare at all times.
In an overlapping generations setting this implies higher consumption than
in a frictionless economy even at the period when the maximum losses
from equity trading are realized. This result highlights that even when an
equity price increase is ex-post unjustied by realized prots, it induces
temporarily higher productivity growth and thereby higher long-run level
of consumption.
The benets come from the wedge between the private and social re-
turns to R&D that is due to the presence of knowledge spillovers in R&D
production. While overpricing leads to overinvestment in R&D at the rm
level, at the aggregate level, R&D investment rises temporarily closer to its
socially optimal level. This has a permanent e¤ect on the level of productiv-
ity of the economy and through this brings wage gains for all generations.
These benets would be left out from the welfare accounting of rm or
sector-level analyses.
The su¢ cient conditions for welfare gains is that equity overpricing is
lasting and is not too high. This means that there are small deviations of
equity prices that are spread over more generations. In such a case, the
consumption gains of overpricing can cover its costs and bring aggregate
welfare gains at all times. The welfare gains are easier to achieve the
higher the productivity of R&D is (i.e., strong knowledge and/or small
congestion e¤ect). In view of this, the benets of equity overpricing are
more likely related to rms engaging in investments in industries producing
new technologies, rather than in old industries.
In this spirit, the model sheds light on why the aggregate impact on
technology-related stocks overpricing is relatively limited compared to other
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sectors. As an illustration, we may contrast the characteristics of new
technologies, like ICT, to those of real estate. In the real estate sector it is
more likely that congestion externalities dominate any positive spillovers.
Under these conditions, a real estate equity price boom that induces rm-
level overinvestment, would always create suboptimally high investment
at the aggregate level and an unambiguously negative e¤ect on aggregate
consumption from losses in the equity market. Therefore, it is more likely
to observe a much stronger aggregate negative e¤ect at the time of bust.
Such an asymmetry between movements of technology and real estate asset
prices is in line with numerous historical examples.
Finally, our model provides the background to review policy in the event
of equity overpricing. This is the case to the extent that public information
about future returns is indeed the driver of equity mispricing, as is built
in our model, as well as to the extent that policy statements can act as
public signals. Indeed, there has been a debate regarding the role of pol-
icy statements in the late 1990s episode. The Economist, September 5th,
2002 featured the following view: ...A less forgivable mistake was that
Mr. Greenspan acted as something of a cheerleader for the new economy.
Even if some increase of productivity was real, his enthusiasm contributed
to investorseuphoria. They seized on all of his comments to justify their
bullishness about future prots.... Our results suggest that when policy
makers can inuence the public signal by issuing statements about equity
market developments during a new technologies boom, they have a clear
incentive to always encourage some overpricing. It is clear, however, that
always encouraging optimism cannot be credible. While a more elaborate
analysis of policy makersincentives is left for future research, a more plau-
sible way to interpret our current insight is that policy makers may lack
incentives to burst a technology bubble, if it has already emerged. More
broadly, it suggests that policy makersability to issue credible statements
about asset market developments may be limited. This is due to the fact
that nancial market participantsreturns from asset trading are not nec-
essarily aligned with the policy makersobjectives who care for aggregate
outcomes.
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A Proof of Proposition 1
The proof starts with specifying the equilibrium R&D growth rate and
consumption in PI economy. From (6) and (18), the growth rate in PI
economy is constant at
gPIA  gPIA;t = 
1
1 
 
 
R 1
 
1  .
Given that from (11) and (18), P PI + t =
 
R 1 +   = R
 
R 1 = RP
PI
and there are no excess capital gains (or losses) in PI economy. Therefore,
aggregate consumption (21) simplies to CPIt = Rw
PI
t 1L. Using, w
PI
t 1 =
(1  )Y PIt 1 and (20) this can be expressed as
CPIt =
R

 APIt 1: (29)
In the model economy, the equilibrium prices are given by (17). Given
that P+k > P PI for 8k 2 f0; :::; T   1g and Pt = P PI for any t <  and
t   + T , the R&D growth rate (14) is gA;t = gPIA , t <  and t   + T;
and gA;+k > gPIA , 8k 2 f0; :::; T   1g. As a result, At > APIt , 8 t >  , so
that Rwt 1L = R At 1 >
R

 APIt 1, 8 t   + 2.
Given the path of prices, the corresponding path of excess capital gains
or losses is:
(Pt + t  RPt 1)At = 0; 8t 2 Z : t 6=  + 1;  + T;
(P +   RP 1)A =   (R 1)RT 1A ;
(P+T + +T  RP+T 1)A+T =  R R 1A+T :
Consolidating the above information,
Ct = C
PI
t , 8t < ;
C = 
 
(R 1)RT 1 +
R

 A 1 = 
 
(R 1)RT 1 + C
PI
 > C
PI
 ;
C+k =
R

 A+k 1 > R A
PI
+k 1 = C
PI
+k;8k 2 f2; :::; T   1g ;
In period t =  + 1, there are no excess gains or losses and there are no
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realized wage benets, so that
C+1 =
R

 A = C
PI
+1;
while in period t = +T , consumers on the one hand receive excess capital
losses and on the other hand wage gains. They consume
C+T =
R

 A+T 1   R R 1A+T . (30)
Whether this is higher or lower than in PI economy depends on the para-
meters of the model.
B Proof of Corollary 1.2
Given the results in Proposition 1, all generations of consumers gain from
a single optimistic public signal i¤ C+T
CPI+T
 1. For period t =  + T   1, the
equilibrium equity price is P+T 1 =
 
R 1 + 
 
R 1 , such that by (14) the
R&D growth rate is gA;+T 1 = 
1
1 
 
 
R 1
 
1  (1 + )

1  = gPIA (1 + )

1  .
From (29) and (30), the condition C+T
CPI+T
 1 can be expressed as
G1(; T )G2()  1, where (31)
G1(; T )  A+T 1API+T 1 and G2()  1  

R 1
h
1 + gPIA (1 + )

1 
i
SinceA+T = (1+gA;+T 1)A+T 1 andAt = APIt , G1(; T ) =
Q+T 2
k= (1+gA;k)
(1+gPIA )
T 1 .
Using, (14) and (17), gA;k = gPIA
 
1 + R
R 1
R 1
RT k+
 
1  for any k 2 f; ::; +
T   2g. From here gA;+T 2 > gA;+T 3 > ::: > gPIA > 0, it is clear
G1(; T ) > 1 and G1(; 2)=
1+gA;+T 2
1+gPIA
G1(; T ) for any T  2. Therefore,
a su¢ cient condition for (31) to hold is that
F () 
h
1 + gPIA
 
1 + 
R
 
1 
i
G2() 
 
1 + gPIA
  0.
One needs to investigate the conditions under which there exists  >
0, such that the above condition holds true. Note that F (0) = 0 and
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lim
!1
F () =  1.38 Furthermore note that F () is continuous in . For
the purpose of this proof, it is su¢ cient to exclude that F () < 0 for any
 > 0. Therefore, it becomes su¢ cient that F () > 0 when making a small
step away from  = 0, i.e., F 0(0) > 0. Given that
F 0() = 1
R

1 g
PI
A (1 + )

1  1G2()+
  
R  1

1 + gPIA
 
1 + 
R
 
1 

1 + gPIA (1 + )

1 

  
(R  1)g
PI
A

1 

1 + gPIA
 
1 + 
R
 
1 

(1 + )

1  1 ;
then the result is
F 0(0) = 1
R

1 g
PI
A   R 1
 
1 + gPIA
2
:
Therefore, F 0(0) > 0 i¤
R 1
R

1  > 
(1+gPIA )
2
gPIA
= 

1+
1
1  (  R 1)

1 
2

1
1  (  R 1)

1 
: (32)
Ceteris paribus, for   > R   1, which ensures that @gPIA
@
> 0, the above
condition is more likely to hold for higher values of . Under the assumption
  > R   1, the LHS of the above inequality becomes an increasing
function of , while the RHS a decreasing one. Therefore, there exists
 = (; ; L; ; ;R) such that the condition (32) holds true, 8 > ,
where  is a solution of (32) with equality. This proves the rst part
of Corollary 1.2. Note that since F () is a continuous function in , then
ceteris paribus, 8 > , Corollary 1.2 is true at least for a range of  2 (0; ],
where F () = 0.
Finally, in order to show that d
dT
> 0, apply the implicit function theo-
rem for
G(; T )  G1(; T )G2()  1 = c > 0:
38This is because F () = 
+1
1  h
 

1  + gPIA (
  1  + zR 1R2 )

1 
in
 
1
1    z R
h
 

1  + gPIA (1 + z
R 1
R )

1 
io
  1+gPIA

+1
1 

and since lim
!1
~ =1 for any ~ > 0, then because the term in parentheses is nite and
negative, it follows that lim
!1F () =  1.
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Then, d
dT
=  GT
G
=  
@G1(;T )
@T
G2()
@G1(;T )
@
G2()+G1(;T )G02()
, where given the analysis
above it is straightforward that @G1(;T )
@
> 0 and G02() > 0.
Therefore, @G1(;T )
@
G2()+G1(; T )G
0
2() > 0, and for
d
dT
> 0, it is su¢ cient
that @G1(;T )
@T
< 0.
Given that T is a discrete variable, @G1(;T )
@T
< 0 holds if G1(;2)
G1(;3)
>
G1(;3)
G1(;4)
> G1(;4)
G1(;5)
> :::, etc. From the results at the beginning of this ap-
pendix G1(; 2) =
1+gPIA (1+ R)

1 
1+gPIA
, G1(; 3) = G1(; 2)

1+gPIA (1+ R2 )

1 

(1+gPIA )
2 ,
G1(; 4) = G1(; 3)

1+gPIA (1+ R3 )

1 

(1+gPIA )
2 ; etc. As
 
1 + 
RT 1
 
1  is decreasing
in T , it is clear that G1(;T 2)
G1(;T 1) >
G1(;T 1)
G1(;T )
and @G1(;T )
@T
< 0. Therefore given
that  > , the degree of temporary equity overpricing, , that increases
consumption of the generation consuming in period  + T is higher.
C Proof of Corollary 1.3
The rst-best allocations maximize the PDV of aggregate consumption in
the economy (or equivalently the PDV of wealth).39 The solution focuses
on a steady-state growth path.
From (3), Xt =
R At
0
xt(j)dj, and (9), consumption in period t is
Ct = (L)
1  R At
0
xt (j)dj  
R At
0
xt(j)dj   It +RMt 1 Mt. Replacing this
in aggregate welfare W1 =
P1
t=1
1
Rt 1Ct, and using the law of motion for
R&D (At+1 = I

t A
1 
t + At) from (6) and (7), the social planner chooses
It; xt(j) and At+1 to maximize
1P
t=1
1
Rt 1

(L)1 
AtR
0
xt (j)dj  
AtR
0
xt(j)dj   It + qA;t
 
At + I

t A
1 
t   At+1

;
where qA;t is the social value of a variety in terms of nal output. Given
the welfare criterion, the decision regarding Mt drops out of the aggregate
welfare given the discount rate of 1
R
, M0 is given and lim
t!1
1
Rt 1Mt ! 0.
The FOC with respect to investment in intermediate-good varieties
1
Rt 1
h

 
L
1 
x 1t (j)  
i
= 0; 8j; implies that its optimal level is con-
39It is assumed that there is perfect information regarding t 8t. The solution to the
deterministic equilibrium provides with a useful benchmark for the PI and the model
economy.
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stant over time and the same across varieties
xSP =



 1
1 
L;8j:
The condition for optimal R&D investment 1
Rt 1
 1 + qA;tI 1t A1 t  =
0, implies that opportunity cost of R&D investment within each period
equals its marginal product
1
qA;t
= 
 
SPt
 1
; (33)
where SPt  I
SP
t
ASPt
. In a steady state R&D growth rate is constant gSPA;t =
gSPA . Given At+1   At = It A1 t , then SPt =

gSPA

 1

= SP is constant
as well and (33) implies constant value of a variety qA;t = qA. The optimal
decision on At+1 implies that
RqA =

(L)1 
 
xSP
   xSP + qA 1 + (1  )  SP  ;
where the path of At ensures that the TVC condition, limT!1
qA
RT
AT = 0,
is satised. For the latter it is su¢ cient that gSPA < R   1. The last two
marginal conditions jointly require that the returns on the two assets are
equal,
R  1 = 1=  gSPA   1  

1
1 
+ (1  )gSPA : (34)
Using the returnsequation result back into 1
qA
= 1=g
SP  1

A , it follows
that the value of a new variety is
P SP  qA =  

1
1 
1
R (1 )gSPA  1
; (35)
where R   1 > (1  )gSP holds true from the TVC condition. The latter
directly contrasts with the market value of a new variety in the PI economy,
which is given by its equity market valuation (18). Comparing (18) with
(35),
PSP
PPI
= 1

1
1 
R 1
R (1 )gSPA  1
:
Given that  < 1; P SP > P PI for any parameter values.
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D Proof of Corollary 1.4
From (33), the socially optimal investment is SP = (qA)
1
1  . Using
At+1   At = It A1 t , the corresponding growth rate of R&D is gSPA =

 
SP

= 
1
1  (qA)

1  . In the PI economy, the growth rate of R&D is
given by (14) when Pt = P PI as gPIA = 
1
1 
 
P PI
 
1  and the investment
PI =
 
P PI
 1
1  .
This implies that there is underinvestment in R&D compared to the
socially optimal (PI < SP ) and lower R&D growth (gPIA < g
SP
A ) if P
PI <
qA. From (18) and (35), this holds if
qA
PPI
= 

1
1 
R 1
R (1 )gSPA  1
> 1:
A su¢ cient condition for this is    11  , which is assumed to be the case
in Section 2.
If  < 
1
1  , there would be a tendency toward overinvestment in
R&D in PI economy because of congestion externality and the optimal
growth rate could be lower than in PI economy.40
E Proofs of Corollaries 1.5 and 1.6
Proof of Corollary 1.5. From (14) and  = 0, we know that the growth
rate gA;t =
At+1 At
At
=  and does not depend on investment and equity
price. It is therefore immediate that At = APIt for any t and output and
wages and realized prots are always the same in the Model and PI economy
(see Section 3). From (21) we then know that any di¤erence between
consumption in the Model and PI economy is driven by capital gains and
losses. Given that there are no capital gains and losses in the PI economy,
it holds for any t that
Ct   CPIt = (Pt + t  RPt 1)At = (Pt + PIt  RPt 1)APIt .
40Notice that in the extreme case where  ! 0, there is always overinvestment in
the PI economy, i.e., qA
PPI
= 0 < 1 and two high R&D growth, i.e., lim
!0
gSPA = 0 and
lim
!0
gPIA = .
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Furthermore, the equilibrium in the asset market remains unchanged, so
that equity prices in the Model economy are given by (17), t = PIt =  .
The only two periods where there are capital gains or losses in the model
economy are  and  + T (see Appendix A). Therefore,
C   CPI =   (R 1)RT 1A =   (R 1)RT 1API > 0
C+T   CPI+T =   RR 1 A+T =   RR 1 API+T =   RR 1 API (1 + )T < 0
Finally, comparing the discounted absolute values of gains and losses, it
holds that
C   CPI  < C   CPI  =RT ; because   API(R 1)RT 1 <  API (1+)T(R 1)RT 1
() 1 < (1 + )T and  > 0.
Proof of Corollary 1.6. From the rst order condition of (6), we know
that Ptt = 1. Using that t = I
 1
t A
1 
t and  = 0 implies that
It
At
=
Pt > 0. Similarly
IPIt
APIt
= P PI > 0: At the same time, the Social Planner
fully acknowledges that At grows exogenously, so that he chooses It; xt(j)
and At+1 to maximize
P1
t=1
1
Rt 1

(L)1 
AtR
0
xt (j)dj  
AtR
0
xt(j)dj   It + qA;t (At(1 + )  At+1)

;
where it is immediate that the rst order condition with respect to It gives
ISPt = 0.
F Solution of the model with innitely lived
consumer with CRRA utility
Consumer problem
Consumer perceive the world as certain in all periods until  (recall
that the arrival of uncertainty is unexpected) and uncertainty resolves in
+T . Therefore for all t   1 and t  +T the consumer problem ((24)
and (25)) is standard give the following Euler equations and no arbitrage
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conditions
Ct+1
Ct

= Rt and Pt+1 +   = RtPt. for t     1 (36)
Cut+1
Cut

= Rut and P
u
t =
Put+1+ 
u
Rut
for t   + T and u 2 fH;Lg
For period t =  until t =  + T   1 the consumers expected utility
can be expressed as
U+k =
P+T 1
s=+k 
s  k (Cs)1  1
1  +
+Q
P1
s=+T
s  k (CHs )
1  1
1  + (1 Q)
P1
s=+T
s  k (CHs )
1  1
1  ,
for k = 0; :::; T   1. Using this and (25) we nd that that the only date
where uncertainty a¤ect the consumer directly is t = +T 1 and therefore
Euler in that period is
(C+T 1)
  = R+T 1

Q
 
CH+T
 
+ (1 Q)  CL+T   (37)
and no arbitrage condition is
P+T 1 =
Q(PH+T+ H)(CH+T )
 
+(1 Q)(PL+T+ L)(CL+T )
 
R+T 1

Q(CH+T )
 
+(1 Q)(CL+T )
  . (38)
while due to the lack of new information in t =  until t =  + T   2, we
have the same FOCs as in before, i.e.,
Ct+1
Ct

= Rt and Pt+1 +   = RtPt. for   t   + T   2 (39)
Steady state
Let as start by looking at the periods after resolution of uncertainty.
We guess and verify a constant interest rate, from  + T onwards. Given
that for t   + T the equity price is
P ut =
 u
Ru 1 (40)
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and from (14)
Ru   1 =  u 1  guA;t  1 (41)
Note that there is a standard negative relationship between growth and
interest rate
We know from the solution of the production side that
Y ut+1 Y ut
Y ut
=
Xut+1 Xut
Xut
= gA. From free entry condition (13) that P ut
(Aut+1 Aut )
Aut
= P ut g
u
A =
Iut
Aut
and therefore the ratio of investments to number of varieties I
u
t
Aut
must be
constant as well in steady state . Therefore
Iut+1
Aut+1
=
Iut
Aut
=) Iut+1
Iut
=
Aut+1
Aut
=
1 + guA. From market clearing (26), we obtain that
Cut+1   Cut = Y ut+1   Y ut  
 
Xut+1  Xut
   Iut+1   Iut 
Cut+1   Cut = guA (Y ut  Xut   Iut ) = guACut
Therefore consumption grows at the same rate as technology. So we need
to solve for gA = gC = g(
Ru   1 =  u 1 (gu)  1
(1 + gu) = Ru
(42)
which gives the following expression for the steady state growth rate
 u
1
 (gu)
 1
 + 1 = (1+g
u)

(43)
It holds that dg
u
du
=  
1
 (gu)
 1

(1+gu) 1

+ 1 

 u
1
 (gu)
  1
 > 0. The growth rate is
higher if the state is realized to be high and due to the negative relationship
between growth and interest rate, it also holds that the interest rate is lower
if the high state realizes.
Using (26), (3), (10) Xt  Atxt, (13) and (42) we nd the consumption
on date  + T as
Cu+T =
1+

 uA+T    
uguA+T
Ru 1 =

1+

 u    gu

 1


A+T (44)
Notice that Cu+T > C
u;PI
+T if and only if A+T > A
PI
+T , which implies
that consumption in  + T and in all the following period is higher if only
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if the period of uncertainty is associated with higher R&D growth rate.
Because (14) implies that growth rate in the model economy is higher that
in PI economy if and only if prices are higher in the model economy than
in PI economy.
Because the PI economy is always in steady state and L = , it is
straightforward that the steady state in PI economy has follows
 
1

 
gPI
  1
 + 1 =
(1+gPI)


CPI+T =

1+

  

gPI

 1


A+T
for any t and the model and PI economy are identical for any t     1.
Period of uncertainty
Given (37), (38), (40), ,(42), (44), (14), (26), (3), (10) Xt  Atxt, and
(13), the growth rate of technology in  + T   1 solves
(gA;+T 1)
1 


1

 
1+gA;+T 1
1+

  ( gA;+T 1 )
1

!
= (45)
Q
 H+
  1 (gH)
1 
 
1+

 H 

gH

 1

! + (1 Q)

 L+
  1 (gL)
1 


 
1+

 L 

gL

 1

!
and given this we can nd all the other relevant variables of the model as
(14) gives P+T 1 = (gA;+T 1)
1 
  
1
 , (26), (3), (10) Xt  Atxt, and
(13)) give
C+T 1 = 1+  A+T 1  
 gA;+T 1

 1
 :
Similarly from above, (39), (14), (26), (3), (10) Xt  Atxt, and (13))
in periods t =  until t =  + T   1 the growth rate of technology solves
(gA;t)
1 


1

 
1+gA;t
1+

  ( gA;t )
1

!
=
(gA;t+1)
1 
 
  1+ 
1+

  ( gA;t+1 )
1

 , (46)
Pt = (gA;t)
1 
  
1
 and
Ct = At

1+

    gA;t

 1


:
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As we have also found the initial steady state and model and PI economy
are initially identical, this characterizes the equilibrium given the initial
conditions.
Necessary and su¢ cient condition for overpricing and higher long-
term technology level
Note that the left hand side of (45) is monotonically increasing in
gA;+T 1. If gA;+T = gL with probability one (as in PI economy), then
we would go back to the initial steady-state condition, as the right hand
side would give RHSPI =

(gL)
1 
  
1
 +  
.
1+

    gAL

 1


and
then it should have been also necessarily that gA;+T 1 = gL. We care for
sequences of growth rates during the boom that result in fgA;+kgT 1k=0 that
are strictly bigger than gL. Given the above, it su¢ ces that the right hand
side of (45) is strictly above RHSPI . We can express it general condition
as requiring that the following function of ~
 ~+g(~)
1 
 
  10@ 1+

 ~ 

g(~)

 1

1A
is increasing in ~. Di¤erentiating and simplifying, we obtain that the nec-
essary and su¢ cient condition is

 +( 1  )
  1 g(~)
1 
 g0(~)
g(~)

~
 ~+g(~)
1 
 
  1
 > 

1+

   1


  1 g(~)
1
 g0(~)
g(~)

~
1+

 ~  
1
 g(~)
1


E¤ectively, the left hand side of this gives on the elasticity of P+T +
+T with respect to the change in the value of ~. The right hand side is
the elasticity of consumption-technology ratio

C+T
A+T

with respect to the
change in , that is multiplied with the risk aversion coe¢ cient. This is
capturing the response of the cost in utility terms of an increase in ~. Note
that as  ! 0, then the right hand side of the expression goes to zero and
the above condition is clearly satised. In contrast, when  !1, then the
utility cost is so high of an additional unit of savings today, that the afore
expression is clearly violated (note that also in this case g; g0 ! 0).
In the way that it is written, also see that g0()
g()
=
"g

, where "g is the
elasticity of the growth rate with respect to . When this ratio is su¢ ciently
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high, then the afore expression would be more easily be satised since the
left hand side is increasing in "g= whereas the right hands side decreases
in it, which proves the second statement on the necessary and su¢ cient
condition in Lemma 2.
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